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ABSTRACT
Game theory, argumentation and dialogues all address problems
concerning inter-agent interaction, but from different perspectives.
In this paper, we contribute to the study of the interplay between
these fields. In particular, we show that by mapping games in nor-
mal form into structured argumentation, computing dominant so-
lutions and Nash equilibria is equivalent to computing admissible
sets of arguments. Moreover, when agents lack complete infor-
mation, computing dominant solutions/Nash equilibria is equiva-
lent to constructing successful (argumentation-based) dialogues.
Finally, we study agents’ behaviour in these dialogues in reverse
game-theoretic terms and show that, using specific notions of util-
ity, agents engaged in (argumentation-based) dialogues are guar-
anteed to be truthful and disclose relevant information, and thus
can converge to dominant solutions/Nash equilibria of the original
games even under incomplete information.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial Intelligence-
multiagent systems, coherence and coordination
Keywords
Argumentation; Dialogues; Games
1. INTRODUCTION
Argumentation (see [3, 4, 37, 28] for overviews) provides means
to reason with incomplete and inconsistent information, e.g. when
this is held by collaborative or competing agents. Argumentation-
based dialogues (e.g. see [2, 31, 32, 30, 6, 26, 39, 21]) study di-
alectical interactions amongst agents. Game theory (see e.g. [42]
for an overview) studies agents’ strategic behaviour. The interplay
between these three fields brings interesting research opportunities,
including addressing the following questions:
• Q1: Could argumentation be used to solve game-theoretic
problems? If so, what are suitable representations, semantics
and interaction models?
• Q2: Could game theory be used to analyse agents’ behaviour
in argumentation? If so, how to formulate behaviour and how
to ensure “good” behaviour?
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Both questions have been partially looked at before, for example,
[9] studied how the stable marriage problem can be modelled us-
ing abstract argumentation (AA); [36, 34, 29] discussed conditions
under which direct mechanisms based on grounded and preferred
semantics for AA [9] are strategy-proof; [16, 25] analysed the com-
putational complexity of behaving strategically in argumentation
dialogues. We look at these questions in the context of Assumption-
based Argumentation (ABA), a form of structured argumentation
(see [10, 41] for overviews). ABA is an instance of AA [11] and
it admits AA as an instance [40]. ABA is well-studied with read-
ily usable results, including a dialectical counterpart (referred to as
ABA dialogues [15]) and soundness results connecting argumenta-
tion and dialogues [15]. ABA affords a finer level of granularity
than AA, allowing, in particular, multiple agents to construct argu-
ments jointly in dialogues, while assessing their acceptability as in
AA. At the same time, ABA is an instance of other structured ar-
gumentation frameworks (such as ASPIC+ [27]) with just enough
constructs to support our analysis in this paper (for example, pref-
erences over rules, accommodated in ASPIC+ but not directly in
ABA, are not required in our analysis).
For both Q1 and Q2, we consider two agents α and β, such that:
1. each agent x ∈ {α, β} has a set of strategies Σx; strategies
are public, namely each agent is aware of the set of strategies
of the other;
2. each agent x is equipped with a payoff function pix, namely
a mapping from pairs of strategies to real numbers such that,
for (σα, σβ) ∈ Σα × Σβ , pix(σα, σβ) denotes the payoff
value of (σα, σβ) for x; the payoff functions are private,
namely each agent is only aware of its own payoff function;
3. a game between α, β is a tuple 〈Σα,Σβ , piα, piβ〉.
We study two well-known solution concepts for these types of
games: dominant solutions and Nash equilibria. A pair of strategies
(σ?α, σ?β) is a dominant solution iff for all pairs of strategies (σα,
σβ) it holds that
piα(σ
?
α, σ
?
β) ≥ piα(σα, σβ) and piβ(σ?α, σ?β) ≥ piβ(σα, σβ).
Also, (σ?α,σ?β) is a Nash equilibrium iff for all (σα, σβ) it holds that
piα(σ
?
α, σ
?
β) ≥ piα(σα, σ?β) and piβ(σ?α, σ?β) ≥ piβ(σ?α, σβ).
In words, dominant solutions are strategy pairs which give the high-
est payoffs to both agents, whereas Nash equilibria are such that
given the strategy adopted by the other agent, neither agent could
do strictly better by adopting another strategy.
We illustrate games and solution concepts with a simple exam-
ple, used throughout the paper.
Wife (β)
r w
Husband (α) m 2,1 0,0
f 0,0 1,2
Table 1: Dinner Party Game payoff matrix.
EXAMPLE 1.1. (Dinner Party Game) Two agents (“husband”
and “wife”) want to organise a dinner party. They decide to split
tasks: the husband will buy either meat (m) or fish (f) for the main
course; the wife will buy either red wine (r) or white wine (w) as
accompanying beverage. The husband (α) has strategies Σα =
{m, f}; the wife (β) has strategies Σβ = {r, w}. The payoffs are
given in Table 1, e.g. piα(m, r) = 2, piβ(m, r) = 1. Both (m, r)
and (f, w) are Nash equilibria; there is no dominant solution for
this game.
Since we are assuming that payoffs are private (and thus agents
have incomplete information), dominant solutions/Nash equilibria
cannot be computed without some information exchange. In our
model, agents use dialogues to support this exchange. As an illus-
tration, for Example 1.1, agents can identify the Nash equilibrium
(m, r) using the following dialogue (expressed in natural language
here and formalised as an ABA dialogue later in Example 4.1):
Husband: meat and red wine make a good combination.
Husband: I assume you are OK with this choice.
Husband: Please let me know if you disagree.
Wife: It is not good if you prefer fish and red wine.
Husband: No, I don’t.
Husband: And you don’t prefer meat and white wine either?
Wife: No, I don’t.
In this dialogue, the agents jointly identify a good combination
of food and wine (a Nash equilibrium) by sharing (and disclosing)
information, but no more than strictly necessary (e.g. the wife does
not disclose her payoff for (m, r) or for any other strategy pair).
In this paper, we address Q1 by using ABA dialogues to com-
pute, in a distributed manner, dominant solutions and Nash equilib-
ria for the kinds of games we consider (Section 4), based upon ABA
formulations of games such that the solution concepts correspond
to admissibility of arguments (Section 3). Moreover, we address
Q2 by modelling ABA dialogues themselves as games and study-
ing dialectical strategies as agents’ game strategies (Section 5).
To ensure truthfulness and disclosure of relevant information from
agents, we use reverse game theory (also known as mechanism de-
sign, see e.g. [19]) and define specific notions of utility to ensure
truthfulness and disclosure in dialogue sequences (Section 6). As
a result, we prove that agents engaged in ABA dialogues can con-
verge to dominant solutions/Nash equilibria of the original games
even under incomplete information.
2. BACKGROUND
Assumption-based Argumentation (ABA) frameworks [41] are
tuples 〈L,R,A, C〉 where
• 〈L,R〉 is a deductive system, with L the language and R a set
of rules of the form s0 ← s1, . . . , sm(m ≥ 0, si ∈ L);
• A ⊆ L is a (non-empty) set, whose elements are assumptions;
• C is a total mapping fromA into 2L−{{}}, where each s ∈ C(a)
is a contrary of a, for a ∈ A.
Given a rule ρ = s0 ← s1, . . . , sm, s0 is referred to as the head
(denoted Head(ρ) = s0) and s1, . . . , sm as the body (denoted
Body(ρ) = {s1, . . . , sm}). All ABA frameworks in this paper are
flat, namely such that no assumption is the head of a rule.
In ABA, arguments are deductions of claims using rules and sup-
ported by sets of assumptions, and attacks are directed at the as-
sumptions in the support of arguments. Following [10]:
• an argument for (claim) s ∈ L supported by A ⊆ A (denoted
A ` s) is a finite tree with nodes labelled by sentences in L or by
τ 1, the root labelled by s, leaves either τ or assumptions in A, and
non-leaves s′ with, as children, the elements of the body of some
rule ρ with head s′ (we say that ρ is in A ` s);
• an argument A1 ` s1 attacks an argument A2 ` s2 iff s1 is a
contrary of some assumption in A2.
A set of arguments ∆ is admissible iff ∆ is conflict-free (i.e. no
argument in ∆ attacks any argument in ∆) and all arguments at-
tacking some argument in ∆ are counter attacked by arguments in
∆; an argument is admissible iff it belongs to an admissible set of
arguments; a sentence is admissible iff it is the claim of an admis-
sible argument.
Two ABA frameworks can be “merged” to form a single joint
framework [13]: given AF = 〈L,R,A, C〉, AF ′ = 〈L,R′,A′,
C′〉, the joint framework (of AF and AF ′) is AF J = 〈L,R ∪
R′,A∪A′, CJ〉, with CJ(a) = C(a)∪ C′(a), for all a ∈ A∪A′.
ABA-dialogues [12, 15] are conducted between two agents, say
α and β, that can be thought of as being equipped with ABA frame-
works 〈L,Rα,Aα, Cα〉 and 〈L,Rβ ,Aβ , Cβ〉 respectively, shar-
ing a common language L. An ABA-dialogue is made of utter-
ances (from agent x ∈ {α, β}) of the form 〈x, y, T, C, ID〉 (for
y ∈ {α, β}, x 6= y) where: C (the content) is one of: claim(s)
for some s ∈ L, rl(s0 ← s1, . . . , sm) for some s0, . . . , sm ∈ L,
asm(a) for some a ∈ L, ctr(a, s) for some a, s ∈ L, a pass sen-
tence pi /∈ L; ID ∈ N (the identifier); T ∈ N ∪ {0} (the target)
such that T < ID. In the remainder, Ux will denote the set of all
possible utterances from agent x.
A dialogue Dxy (χ) (between x and y, x, y ∈ {α, β}, x 6= y,
for χ ∈ L), is a sequence 〈u1, . . . , un〉, n ≥ 0, where each ul,
l = 1, . . . , n, is an utterance, and: u1 = 〈x, y, _, _, _〉;2 the con-
tent of ul is claim(χ) iff l = 1; the target of pass and claim utter-
ances is 0; the target of regular utterances is not 0; the identifier of
an utterance represents the position of the utterance in a dialogue,
and the target of a non-pass, non-claim utterance is the identifier of
some earlier utterance.
The framework drawn from dialogue δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉 is Fδ =
〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 where
• Rδ = {ρ|rl(ρ) is the content of some ui in δ};
• Aδ = {a|asm(a) is the content of some ui in δ};
• Cδ(a) = {s|ctr(a, s) is the content of some ui in δ}.
Restrictions can be imposed on dialogues so that they fulfil de-
sirable properties, and in particular that P1) the framework drawn
from them is a flat ABA framework , and P2) utterances are related
to their target utterances, where uj = 〈_, _, T, Cj , _〉 is related to
ui = 〈_, _, _, Ci, ID〉 iff T = ID and one of the following holds:
• Cj = rl(ρj), Head(ρj) = s and either Ci = rl(ρi) with
s ∈ Body(ρi), or Ci = ctr(_, s), or Ci = claim(s);
• Cj = asm(a) and either Ci = rl(ρ) with a ∈ Body(ρ),
or Ci = ctr(_, a), or Ci = claim(a);
• Cj = ctr(a, _) and Ci = asm(a).
Properties P1) and P2) above can be enforced using legal-move
functions, which are mappings from dialogues to sets of utterances
such that there is no repeated utterance to the same target in a dia-
logue compatible with a legal-move function. We assume that di-
alogues compatible with legal-move functions defined later in the
paper also satisfy both P1 and P2.
ABA dialogues can be used to check admissibility of claims:
an ABA dialogue is deemed successful iff its claim is admissible
1τ /∈ L represents “true” and stands for the empty body of rules.
2Throughout, _ stands for an anonymous variable as in Prolog.
in the ABA framework drawn from the dialogue [15].3 Strategy-
move functions [13] can be used to model agents’ behaviour, to-
wards fulfillment of their aims, in ABA dialogues. A strategy-
move function for agent x is a mapping φ from dialogues and
legal-move functions to Ux such that φ(δ, λ) ⊆ λ(δ). Given a
dialogue δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉 between agents x, y compatible with
a legal-move function λ and a strategy-move function φ for x, if
for all utterances um made by x, um ∈ φ(〈u1, . . . , um−1〉, λ),
then x uses φ in δ. If x and y both use φ, then δ is constructed
with φ. The strategy-move function we use in this work is the
thorough strategy-move function, φh. Informally, a dialogue con-
structed with φh contains all information that is relevant to the
claim from both agents. Dialogues constructed with φh have the
desirable property that admissible arguments obtained in the dia-
logue are admissible in the joint ABA framework of the two agents,
see Theorem 1 in [13]. It is important to note that the thorough
strategy-move function does not force agents to utter all knowledge
but only information relevant to the claim.
Mechanism Design (e.g. see [19]) provides an abstraction of
distributed problem solving amongst self-interested agents interact-
ing with each other. In the language of mechanism design, agents
are characterised by types, which are abstractions of their internal,
private beliefs. Given two agents, α, β, the space of possible types
for agent x ∈ {α, β} is denoted by Θx and its type is θx ∈ Θx.
Moreover, Θ = Θα ×Θβ .
Inter-agent interactions have a number of potential outcomes O.
A given social choice function f : Θ → O characterises what
can be deemed to be a socially optimal outcome of the interaction.
Agents’ self-interest is expressed in terms of (private) utility func-
tions vx : O ×Θx → R. Ax is the set of possible actions of agent
x and A = Aα × Aβ . The decision for agent x of which action to
perform is given by a strategy4. Let Sx denote the space of possible
strategies for agent x, S = Sα × Sβ . Then a strategy sx ∈ Sx is a
function sx : Θx ×A→ Ax.
Finally, a mechanismM = (A, g) consists of the action space
A and an outcome function g : S → O, where g(s) is the outcome
implemented byM for strategy s = (sα, sβ).
A social choice function specifies the desired goal of an interac-
tion, whereas a mechanism is a means of characterising the agents’
behaviour in the interaction. Several characterisations of strategies
have been provided as ways to predict how (rational) agents will
behave in a mechanism. In particular, a strategy sx is dominant
(for x) if it maximises the agent’s utility irrespectively of the other
agent’s strategy. For a mechanismM = (A, g) and a social choice
function f ,M implements f iff g(s) = f(θ), where s is a domi-
nant strategy.
3. GAME SOLUTIONS IN ABA
As a general purpose framework, ABA can be used to represent
knowledge in many applications [41]. Here, we give ABA repre-
sentations of games of the kind presented in Section 1 and show a
correspondence between admissible sentences in these frameworks
and dominant solutions / Nash equilibria for the games.
Firstly, we specify the languages underlying the ABA frame-
works we will use.
DEFINITION 3.1. Given a game 〈Σα,Σβ , piα, piβ〉, the Domi-
nant/Nash languages are (respectively):
3ABA dialogues for the grounded and ideal semantics have also
been defined in [15], but we only need admissiblity in this work.
4In Section 1, including Example 1.1, strategies are considered as
actions directly, for ease of presentation.
• LD = {d(σα, σβ), nD(σα, σβ), vA(σα, σβ)>vA(σ′α, σ′β),
vB(σα, σβ) > vB(σ
′
α, σ
′
β)|σα, σ′α ∈ Σα, σβ , σ′β ∈ Σβ};
• LN = {n(σα, σβ), nN(σα, σβ), vA(σα, σβ)>vA(σ′α, σ′β),
vB(σα, σβ) > vB(σ
′
α, σ
′
β)|σα, σ′α ∈ Σα, σβ , σ′β ∈ Σβ}.
Intuitively, the sentences in LD/LN can be read as follows:
d(σα, σβ)/n(σα, σβ) stands for “(σα, σβ) is a dominant solution/
Nash equilibrium” (respectively); nD(σα, σβ)/nN(σα, σβ) stands
for “(σα, σβ) is not a dominant solution /Nash equilibrium” (re-
spectively); vA(σα, σβ) > vA(σ′α, σ′β) represents that, for agent
α, the payoff value of (σα, σβ) is higher than the payoff value of
(σ′α, σ
′
β); vB(σα, σβ) > vB(σ
′
α, σ
′
β) can be read similarly for
agent β.
Preferences between strategy pairs (namely sentences of the form
vA(σα, σβ) > vA(σ
′
α, σ
′
β)) are heads of preference rules, deter-
mined by the agents’ private payoff functions, as follows:
DEFINITION 3.2. Given a game 〈Σα,Σβ , piα, piβ〉, the prefer-
ence rulesRpα, for α, andRpβ , for β, are:
Rpα = {vA(σα, σβ) > vA(σ′α, σ′β)← |σα, σ′α ∈ Σα,
σβ , σ
′
β ∈ Σβ , piα(σα, σβ) > piα(σ′α, σ′β)};
Rpβ = {vB(σα, σβ) > vB(σ′α, σ′β)← |σα, σ′α ∈ Σα,
σβ , σ
′
β ∈ Σβ , piβ(σα, σβ) > piβ(σ′α, σ′β)}.
EXAMPLE 3.1. (Example 1.1 cont.) For the husband,Rpα is:
{vA(m, r) > vA(m,w)←, vA(m, r) > vA(f, r)←,
vA(m, r) > vA(f, w)←, vA(f, w) > vA(f, r)←,
vA(f, w) > vA(m,w)←}.
For the wife,Rpβ is:
{vB(m, r) > vB(m,w)←, vB(m, r) > vA(f, r)←,
vB(f, w) > vB(f, r)←, vB(f, w) > vA(m,w)←,
vB(f, w) > vB(m, r)←}.
We then define ABA frameworks for capturing dominant solu-
tions.
DEFINITION 3.3. Given a game 〈Σα,Σβ , piα, piβ〉, the Domi-
nant ABA framework 〈LD,RD,AD, CD〉 has:
• RD consisting ofRpα ∪Rpβ together with:5
nD(σα, σβ)← vA(_, _) > vA(σα, σβ),
nD(σα, σβ)← vB(_, _) > vB(σα, σβ);
• AD = {d(σα, σβ)|σα ∈ Σα, σβ ∈ Σβ};
• for each d(σα, σβ) ∈ AD , CD(d(σα, σβ)) = {nD(σα, σβ)}.
Note that Dominant ABA frameworks are flat (see Section 2).
The intuition of this definition is the following. Each strategy
pair can be assumed to be a dominant solution (in that d(σα, σβ) ∈
AD for each (σα, σβ)). A pair (σα, σβ) can be deemed to be
not dominant iff there is another pair (σ′α, σ′β) such that either
piα(σ
′
α, σ
′
β) > piα(σα, σβ) or piβ(σ
′
α, σ
′
β) > piβ(σα, σβ), de-
scribed by the the definition of contrary and by the two rule schemata
in Definition 3.3, respectively (by instantiating vA(_, _), vB(_, _)
to vA(σ′α, σ′β), vB(σ
′
α, σ
′
β), respectively).
Admissible sentences in Dominant ABA frameworks correspond
to dominant solutions, as follows.
THEOREM 3.1. Given a game 〈Σα,Σβ , piα, piβ〉, a strategy pair
(σ?α, σ
?
β) is a dominant solution iff d(σ
?
α, σ
?
β) is admissible in the
Dominant ABA framework.
5For brevity, here and in the remainder of the paper, we use
schemata with variables (σα, σβ) and anonymous variables (_) to
represent compactly all rules that can be obtained by instantiating
the variables over the appropriate domains.
PROOF. (⇒) To show (σ?α, σ?β) is a dominant solution is to
show for all other strategy pairs (σα, σβ), piα(σ?α, σ?β) ≥ piα(σα, σβ)
and piβ(σ?α, σ?β) ≥ piβ(σα, σβ). Suppose otherwise, namely there
is (σ′α, σ′β) such that piα(σ
′
α, σ
′
β) > piα(σ
?
α, σ
?
β). Thus, by Def-
inition 3.2, vA(σ′α, σ′β) > vA(σ
?
α, σ
?
β) ←∈ Rpα. Given the rule
nD(σα, σβ)← vA(σ′α, σ′β) > vA(σα, σβ) in the Dominant ABA
framework, let σα = σ?α and σβ = σ?β ; then argument {} `
nD(σ?α, σ
?
β) attacks {d(σ?α, σ?β)} ` d(σ?α, σ?β) = A. Therefore
A is not admissible, so d(σ?α, σ?β) is not admissible either. Contra-
diction.
(⇐) To show d(σ?α, σ?β) is admissible is to show that there is a set
of argument ∆ such that {d(σ?α, σ?β)} ` d(σ?α, σ?β) = A ∈ ∆ and
∆ is conflict-free and counterattacks all attacking arguments. Since
C(d(σ?α, σ?β)) = {nD(σ?α, σ?β)}, arguments attacking A are of the
form {} ` nD(σ?α, σ?β). Since (σ?α, σ?β) is a dominant solution,
there is no (σ′α, σ′β) such that piα(σ
′
α, σ
′
β) > piα(σ
?
α, σ
?
β). Thus
vA(σ′α, σ
′
β) > vA(σ
?
α, σ
?
β)←/∈ Rpα. Therefore {} ` nD(σ?α, σ?β)
is not an argument and ∆ = {A} is not attacked. Thus d(σ?α, σ?β)
is admissible.
EXAMPLE 3.2. (Example 3.1 cont.) There is no dominant solu-
tion in this game. Indeed, for any (σ?α, σ
?
β), d(σ
?
α, σ
?
β) is not admis-
sible in the Dominant ABA framework. For instance, for σ?α = m
and σ?β = r, the argument {d(m, r)} ` d(m, r) is attacked by the
argument {} ` nD(m, r) (this argument uses the rule vB(f, w) >
vB(m, r) ←, and cannot be counter-attacked). Thus, an argu-
mentative reading of the process for sanctioning d(σ?α, σ
?
β) as non-
dominant is:
1. {d(m, r)} ` d(m, r): let us assume that (m, r) is domi-
nant;
2. {} ` nD(m, r) (using vB(f, w) > vB(m, r) ←) attacks
the assumption/argument supporting the assumption:6 (m, r)
is not dominant because (f, w) has a higher payoff value
than (m, r) for agent β.
We can also easily define ABA frameworks for capturing Nash
Equilibria as follows.
DEFINITION 3.4. Given a game 〈Σα,Σβ , piα, piβ〉, the Nash
ABA framework 〈LN ,RN ,AN , CN 〉 has:
• RN consisting ofRpα ∪Rpβ together with:
nN(σα, σβ)← vA(_, σβ) > vA(σα, σβ),
nN(σα, σβ)← vB(σα, _) > vB(σα, σβ);
• AN = {n(σα, σβ)|σα ∈ Σα, σβ ∈ Σβ};
• for each n(σα, σβ) ∈ AN , CN (n(σα, σβ)) = {nN(σα, σβ)}.
Note that Nash ABA frameworks are also flat (see Section 2).
The intuition behind this definition is analogous to that behind
Definition 3.3, except that upon checking Nash equilibria, one agent’s
payoff in a strategy pair only needs to be compared to strategy pairs
with the other agent playing the same strategy (see the two rule
schemata in Definition 3.4).
THEOREM 3.2. Given a game 〈Σα,Σβ , piα, piβ〉, a strategy pair
(σα, σβ) is a Nash equilibrium iff n(σα, σβ) is admissible in the
Nash ABA framework.
6Note that, in flat ABA frameworks, arguments supporting assump-
tions necessarily use no rules and are supported by the assumptions
themselves.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is similar to the one of Theorem 3.1.
EXAMPLE 3.3. (Example 3.1 cont.) The two Nash Equilibria
are: (m, r) and (f, w); indeed, both n(m, r) and n(f, w) are
admissible in the Nash ABA framework. For instance, again for
σ?α = m and σ
?
β = r, we can see that the argument {n(m, r)} `
n(m, r) is not attacked by any argument as there is no rule with
head vA(f, r) > vA(m, r) or vB(m,w) > vB(m, r). Argumen-
tatively, (m, r) is a Nash Equilibrium since α does not think (f, r)
has a higher payoff value than (m, r) and β does not think (m,w)
has a higher payoff value than (m, r).
Note that as we can see that both Dominant ABA frameworks
and Nash ABA frameworks are identical except for some rules, we
could use a unified framework by taking the “union” of the two.
We leave them seperate in this work for clarity.
4. GAME SOLUTIONS VIA ABA DIALOGUES
In addition to computing solutions with complete information
statically, dominant solutions and Nash equilibria can be computed
dynamically, with only partial information held by each agent, through
ABA dialogues. More specifically, each agent is only aware of its
own half of the overall payoff matrix and the corresponding prefer-
ence rules; however, both agents hold the rules for computing so-
lutions (represented in the shared schemata, assumptions and con-
traries in Definitions 3.3 and 3.4, respectively).
In the remainder of the paper, unless specified otherwise, we as-
sume as given a game 〈Σα,Σβ , piα, piβ〉 and corresponding Domi-
nant / Nash ABA framework 〈LX ,RX ,AX , CX〉 (for X = D / N
respectively). Then, the ABA frameworks held by α and β will be
denoted by α = 〈LX ,Rα,Aα, Cα〉 and β = 〈LX ,Rβ ,Aβ , Cβ〉,
such that:
• Rα = RX \ Rpβ ; • Rβ = RX \ Rpα;
• Aα = Aβ = AX ; • Cα(a) = Cβ(a) = CX(a), for all a ∈ AX .
Thus, the ABA framework held by an agent contains exactly the
same information as the available strategies and (private) payoff
function, as well as information as to which notion of solution the
agents are striving towards.
Through ABA dialogues, while exchanging relevant informa-
tion, agents can identify solutions even if they hold only incomplete
information. Dominant / Nash dialogues for computing dominant
solutions and Nash Equilibria use specific legal-move functions:
DEFINITION 4.1. The Dominant Legal-move function λd is such
that given a dialogue δ, each utterance u ∈ λd(δ) has content in
one of the following forms (for some σα, σ′α ∈ Σα, σβ , σ′β ∈ Σβ):
• claim(d(σα, σβ)),
• asm(d(σα, σβ)), • ctr(d(σα, σβ),nD(σα, σβ)),
• rl(nD(σα, σβ)← vA(σ′α, σ′β) > vA(σα, σβ)),
• rl(nD(σα, σβ)← vB(σ′α, σ′β) > vB(σα, σβ)),
• rl(vA(σ′α, σ′β) > vA(σα, σβ)←),
• rl(vB(σ′α, σ′β) > vB(σα, σβ)←).
The Nash Legal-move function λn is defined as λd with
• d(σα, σβ) replaced by n(σα, σβ);
• nD(σα, σβ) replaced by nN(σα, σβ);
• the two rule schemata with heads nD(σα, σβ) replaced by
their counterparts in the Nash ABA framework with heads nN(σα, σβ).
A dialogue δ is a Dominant / Nash dialogue iff δ is compatible
with λd / λn, respectively. The strategy pair in the claim of δ is
called the claim pair.
Definition 4.1 gives the dialectical counterpart of Definitions 3.3
and 3.4. It specifies the allowed utterances for agents in Dominant /
Nash dialogues. However, it does not force agents to disclose their
private preferences. In particular, the last two rules in the definition
of λd may not be preference rules in the ABA framework of the
utterer (in other words, they may be lies). As seen in Section 2, the
thorough strategy-move function φh can be used to dictate agents
to be honest, by disclosing all relevant information they hold.
THEOREM 4.1. For any Dominant / Nash dialogue δ with claim
pair (σ?α, σ
?
β) constructed with φh, δ is successful iff (σ
?
α, σ
?
β) is a
dominant solution / Nash equilibrium.
PROOF. Follows from Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, and Theorem 1 in
[13].
Note that Theorem 4.1 sanctions both directions of the “equiva-
lence” between dialogues and games.
EXAMPLE 4.1. (Example 3.3 cont.) We illustrate the Nash di-
alogue Dαβ (n(m, r)) being successful as follows:
〈α, β, 0, claim(n(m, r)), 1〉
〈α, β, 1, asm(n(m, r)), 2〉
〈α, β, 2, ctr(n(m, r), nN(m, r)), 3〉
〈β, α, 3, rl(nN(m, r)← vA(f, r) > vA(m, r)), 4〉
〈α, β, 0, pi, 5〉
〈α, β, 3, rl(nN(m, r)← vB(m,w) > vB(m, r)), 6〉
〈β, α, 0, pi, 7〉
This is a Nash dialogue as it is compatible with the Nash legal-
move function given in Definition 4.1. A natural language reading
of this dialogue is given in Section 1. In utterances 1-3, α assumes
(m, r) being a Nash equilibrium with contrary nN(m, r). β utters
the two rules for nN(m, r) in utterances 4, 5. Since α does not
prefer (f, r) to (m, r) nor β prefers (m,w) to (m, r), no more
utterances are made. Thus, jointly the agents verify that (m, r)
is a Nash equilibrium. Overall, the only argument they generate
and exchange (implicitly) is {n(m, r)} ` n(m, r) (this is the only
argument in the ABA framework drawn from the dialogue). Since
there is no attack against this argument (in the ABA framework
drawn from the dialogue), the claim is admissible and the dialogue
is successful.
Example 4.1 also illustrates a difference between using struc-
tured rather than abstract argumentation (AA) as the argumentation
framework underlying interactions between agents (in general and
in the context of determining game solutions). From an AA view
point, the dialogue in Example 4.1 solely introduces an argument
(for (m, r) being a Nash equilibrium). The dialogue also attempts
to generate attacks against this argument (one attempt is given by
utterances 3 and 4, another by utterances 3 and 6). The attempts
allow to share additional information (as to the absence of prefer-
ences in this case). This may be useful, for example, when agents
have only partial information about the world before engaging in a
dialogue, and may benefit from information from the other agents
to even determine their payoff functions. We leave this extension
to our current, standard game model as future work.
The following example further illustrates how ABA dialogues
support the sharing of information, but in the case of non-successful
Dominant dialogues.
EXAMPLE 4.2. (Example 3.2 cont.) The following Dominant
dialogue Dαβ (d(m, r)), attempting to determine whether d(m, r)
is a dominant solution, is not successful:
〈α, β, 0, claim(d(m, r)), 1〉
〈α, β, 1, asm(d(m, r)), 2〉
〈α, β, 2, ctr(d(m, r), nD(m, r)), 3〉
〈β, α, 3, rl(nD(m, r)← vA(m,w) > vA(m, r)), 4〉
〈α, β, 3, rl(nD(m, r)← vA(f, r) > vA(m, r)), 5〉
〈α, β, 3, rl(nD(m, r)← vA(f, w) > vA(m, r)), 6〉
〈α, β, 3, rl(nD(m, r)← vB(m,w) > vB(m, r)), 7〉
〈α, β, 3, rl(nD(m, r)← vB(f, r) > vB(m, r)), 8〉
〈α, β, 3, rl(nD(m, r)← vB(f, w) > vB(m, r)), 9〉
〈β, α, 9, rl(vB(f, w) > vB(m, r)←), 10〉
〈α, β, 0, pi, 11〉
〈β, α, 0, pi, 12〉
This is a Dominant dialogue as it is compatible with the Dom-
inant legal-move function of Definition 4.1. It constructs two ar-
guments: {d(m, r)} ` d(m, r) and {} ` nD(m, r); the latter
attacks the former. Therefore, the claim d(m, r) is not admissible
(in the ABA framework drawn from the dialogue) and the dialogue
is not successful. Nonetheless, after the dialogue the agents share
information of the preference by β of (f, w) over (m, r) (although
not the utility of either for β). Whether this is an actual prefer-
ence of β depends on whether β has been truthfully honest in the
dialogue. This is the topic of the next section.
5. DIALECTICAL STRATEGIES FOR ABA
DIALOGUES
The dialogue in Example 4.1 is constructed with φh (see Sec-
tion 2). However, if we consider agents being self interested, we
need to ask:
What are the conditions for agents to be honest in dia-
logues?
We pose this question in a game theoretic setting and analyse
agent behaviours in dialogues understood as games themselves.
Thus, we introduce a meta-level dialectical game on top of the orig-
inal underlying game (e.g. the Dinner party game in Example 1.1).
Note that although both agents carry information from the under-
lying game into the meta-level game, they do not necessarily carry
the payoffs. Indeed, designing appropriate utilities for the meta-
level game is needed to ensure good behaviour (truthfulness and
disclosure) from agents.
We formulate (reverse) game-theoretic notions for dialogues as
follows. We first define the types of agents as their strategies and
payoffs in the underlying game, represented within their (Dominant
or Nash) ABA frameworks.
DEFINITION 5.1. The types of agents α and β are θα = α and
θβ = β, respectively.
In ABA dialogues, agents put forward claims, rules, assumptions
and contraries. We hence view sequences of utterances as agents’
actions in the meta-level dialectical game and define strategies in
the meta-level dialectical game as functions determining utterances
in dialogues (that can be equated with strategy-move functions, as
we shall see). Formally:
DEFINITION 5.2. The action space for agent x ∈ {α, β} is
2U
x
.
DEFINITION 5.3. A strategy for agent x ∈ {α, β} (in the meta-
level dialectical game) is a function sδx, for some dialogue δ, such
that sδx(θx, δ) = {u|u = 〈x, _, _, _, _〉 ∈ δ}.
Since sδx returns the set of utterances made by x in δ, which
is determined by the strategy-move function φ used by x, we can
equate strategies in the meta-level dialectical game with strategy-
move functions. If δ is constructed with φh, then sδx is called the
honest strategy (in the meta-level dialectical game).
Since a dialogue can either be successful or not, we let the meta-
level outcome depend on the dialogue outcome such that if the di-
alogue is successful, then the outcome is the claim pair; otherwise,
the outcome is the empty set, formally:
DEFINITION 5.4. Given a dialogue δ = Dxy (X(σ?α, σ?β)), x, y ∈
{α, β}, x 6= y,X ∈ {d, n}, the outcome function g(δ) is such
that:
g(δ) =
{
(σ?α, σ
?
β) if δ is successful,
{} otherwise.
Note that success of a dialogue amounts to admissibility of its
claim in the ABA framework drawn from the dialogue (see Sec-
tion 2). Thus, if the agents are not truthful within the dialogue, the
claim pair may not be a dominant solution/Nash equilibrium.
To define the utility function, we first define the honesty reward,
a means to encourage agents’ truthfulness. Inspired by Vickrey
auctions[23], in Dominant dialogues, the honesty reward for each
agent is set to the second highest payoff of the underlying game;
in Nash dialogues, the honesty reward is the second highest payoff
given the other agent’s behaviour in the underlying game. For-
mally:
DEFINITION 5.5. The honesty rewardWx ∈ R (for x ∈ {α, β})
is given as follows:
• For Dominant dialogues, let 〈v1x, v2x, . . .〉 be the list of of pay-
offs of agent x such that v1x > v
2
x > . . .; thenWx = v2x;
• For Nash dialogues, let (σ?α, σ?β) be the claim pair, and
– let 〈v1α, v2α, . . .〉 be the list of payoffs of α when β plays
σ?β in the underlying game, such that v
1
α > v
2
α > . . .;
thenWα = v2α;
– let 〈v1β , v2β , . . .〉 be the list of payoffs of β when α plays
σ?α in the underlying game, such that v
1
β > v
2
β > . . .;
thenWβ = v2β .
An agent’s utility is defined so that the agent either gets its pay-
off in the underlying game (when the dialogue is successful) or its
honesty reward (otherwise):
DEFINITION 5.6. The utility of agent x ∈ {α, β} in dialogue δ
is vx such that:
vx =
{
pix(σ
?
α, σ
?
β) if g(δ) = (σ
?
α, σ
?
β),
Wx otherwise.
Generally speaking, the honesty reward is set to ensure that be-
ing truthful yields a higher utility than being dishonest for both
agents while participating in Dominant / Nash dialogues. Indeed,
with utilities defined as such, we show that truthfully disclosing all
relevant information is the best option for both agents. Formally:
THEOREM 5.1. Given a Dominant / Nash dialogue δ, the hon-
est strategy sδx is dominant (for agent x).
PROOF. (Sketch.) We show the case for Dominant dialogues-
The other case, Nash dialogues, is similar. To show that sδx is a
dominant strategy is to show that being thorough gives the highest
utility. There are four possible cases in total. (Below, we say that a
strategy pair is dominant for x if it gives the highest payoff to x.7)
C1: (σ?α,σ?β) is dominant for both agents;
C2: (σ?α,σ?β) is dominant for β, but not α;
C3: (σ?α,σ?β) is dominant for α, but not β;
C4: (σ?α,σ?β) is not dominant for either α or β.
7Note that dominant is overloaded in this paper. A pair of strategies
can be a dominant solution as defined in Section 1; a single strategy
can be dominant as defined at the end of Section 2; and a pair of
strategies can be dominant for a single agent as used here.
C1 β
H D
α H (σ?α,σ?β) {}
D {} {}
C2 β
H D
α H {} {}
D (σ?α,σ?β) {}
C3 β
H D
α H {} (σ?α,σ?β)
D {} {}
C4 β
H D
α H {} {}
D {} (σ?α,σ?β)
Table 2: Four possible Cases C1 - C4.
Agents can either be honest (H) or dishonest (D). Dialogues can
either return its claim pair (if it is successful) or the empty set (oth-
erwise). The dialectical interaction can be viewed as games sum-
marised in Table 2.
C1: In this case, (σ?α, σ?β) is a dominant solution, honesty from
both agents ensures a successful dialogue (Theorem 4.1), giving
the top left cell (H, H). Thus, by Definition 5.6, honesty from
both agents gives the highest possible utility, pix(σ?α, σ?β) for x ∈
{α, β}. Moreover, regardless what the other agent does, being hon-
est yields no less utility.
C2: We first explain how this table is computed.
Since (σ?α, σ?β) is not dominant for α, there is some strategy
pair (σα, σβ) such that piα(σα, σβ) > piα(σ?α, σ?β), which gives
vA(σα, σβ) > vA(σ
?
α, σ
?
β) ← in Rpα (Definition 3.2). Thus, as
long as α is honest, by uttering this rule in δ, δ will be unsuccessful
and return {} (the top row in the C2 table).
If α is dishonest, i.e. α hides this rule in δ, while β is being
honest (resulting in the cell (H, D)), since (σ?α, σ?β) is dominant for
β, β has no rule to attack d(σ?α, σ?β), thus δ will be successful and
the outcome of δ is the claim pair (σ?α, σ?β) (lower left cell in the
C2 table).
If bothα and β are dishonest (D, D), β lies about having (σα, σβ)
such that vB(σα, σβ) > vB(σ?α, σ?β)← is uttered in δ and δ is un-
successful and returns {} (lower right cell in the C2 table).
With the C2 table constructed as such, we observe that α should
choose to be honest (i.e. choose to be in the top row) to receive
Wα as, by Definition 5.5, Wα ≥ piα(σ?α, σ?β) (since (σ?α, σ?β) is
not dominant for α). β should also choose to be honest as β either
receivesWβ (when α is honest, resulting in (H, H)) or piβ(σ?α, σ?β)
(when α lies, resulting in (D, H)). Since (σ?α, σ?β) is dominant for
β, piβ(σ?α, σ?β) >Wβ . Thus, being honest is also dominant for β.
C3: This case is case C2 with the two agents swapped.
C4: Honesty gives both agentsWx, otherwise each receives either
pix(σ
?
α, σ
?
β) or Wx, x ∈ {α, β}. Since (σ?α, σ?β) is not dominant
for the agents, by Definition 5.5,Wx ≥ pix(σ?α, σ?β).
In all cases, the honest strategy dominates.
We observe that the honesty reward as defined in Definition 5.5
gives enough incentive to both agents to be honest so hiding infor-
mation or inserting false information does not bring higher utility
to either of the two. Moreover, from the proof of Theorem 5.1, we
observe that the setting for the honesty reward is very crucial to this
result. Indeed, the following lemma holds.
LEMMA 5.1. Given a Dominant / Nash dialogue δ, the honest
strategy sδx is not dominant (for agent x) if the honesty rewardWx
is such thatWx < v2x, for v2x as in Definition 5.5.
PROOF. (Sketch.) Again, we only show the Dominant case as
the Nash case is similiar. As in the proof of Theorem 5.1, we need
to consider four possible cases C1-C4. The outcomes remain the
same as in Table 2. In the case of C2, suppose that piα(σ?α, σ?β) =
v2α. If Wx < v2x, then α is better off being dishonest and hiding
the rule vA(σα, σβ) > vA(σ?α, σ?β) ← to make δ successful. By
doing so, α could receive v2α (if β is honest), which is better than
Wα, which is the utility of α while being honest (δ would not be
successful when α is honest). Thus, the honest strategy sδx is not
dominant.
6. DIALOGUE SEQUENCES FOR FINDING
SOLUTIONS
A single Dominant / Nash dialogue only tests if a single strat-
egy pair is a dominant solution or a Nash equilibrium. To iden-
tify all dominant solutions / Nash equilibria, multiple dialogues are
needed. We define dialogue sequences as follows.
DEFINITION 6.1. A (dialogue) sequence S between α, β is a
set of dialogues S = {Dy1x1(χ1), . . . ,Dynxn(χn)} such that n > 0
and for all i, j = 1, . . . , n, xi, yi ∈ {α, β}, xi 6= yi and if i 6= j
then χi 6= χj .
A sequence is a dominant / Nash sequence iff (1) all dialogues
in the sequence are Dominant / Nash dialogues (respectively); (2)
for all σα ∈ Σα and σβ ∈ Σβ , (σα, σβ) is the claim pair for some
dialogue in the sequence; and (3) all claims of dialogues in the
sequences are claim pairs (σα, σβ), for σα ∈ Σα and σβ ∈ Σβ .
Here, we only consider Dominant or Nash sequences.
We do not repeat the definition for action space but assume the
one given in Definition 5.2 remains unchanged for sequences.
Similarly to Definition 5.3, we define sequence strategies as re-
turning utterances in (all dialogues in) the sequence. Note that this
setting also effectively equates sequence strategies with strategy-
move functions used in dialogues in the sequence.
DEFINITION 6.2. For any sequence S = {δ1, . . . , δn} between
α and β, the sequence strategy sSx for x ∈ {α, β} is such that
sSx (θx, S) = {u|u = 〈x, _, _, _, _〉 ∈ δi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
We refer to a sequence strategy sSx as honest iff the strategy-move
function used by x in its dialogues is φh.
The outcome function g wrt a sequence is as follows.
DEFINITION 6.3. Given a sequence S, the outcome function
gX , forX = D/N , is such that gX(S) = {(σ?α, σ?β)|Y (σ?α, σ?β) is
the topic of δ ∈ S, for Y = d/n, respectively, and δ is successful}.
We continue to use the utility setting for single dialogues given
in Definition 5.6 and let the utility of a sequence be the sum of the
utilities of dialogues in the sequence, defined as follows.
DEFINITION 6.4. The utility of agent x ∈ {α, β} in sequence
S = {δ1, . . . , δn} is svx =∑ni=1 vix, where, for i = 1 . . . n, vix is
the utility of x in δi, as in Definition 5.6.
As a corollary to Theorem 5.1, the following holds.
COROLLARY 6.1. Given a Dominant / Nash sequence S, the
honest sequence strategy sSx is dominant (for agent x).
We define the Dominant / Nash social choices as follows.
DEFINITION 6.5. The Dominant social choice function is de-
fined as
fd(θα, θβ) = {(σ?α, σ?β)|(σ?α, σ?β) is a dominant solution,
for σ?α ∈ Σα, σ?β ∈ Σβ }.
The Nash social choice function is defined as
fn(θα, θβ) = {(σ?α, σ?β)|(σ?α, σ?β) is a Nash equilibrium,
for σ?α ∈ Σα, σ?β ∈ Σβ }.
Namely, the Dominant / Nash social choice function returns all
dominant solutions / Nash equilibria (respectively) in the underly-
ing game. The following theorem holds.
THEOREM 6.1. The mechanismM = (A, gX), where A is the
action space, as given in Definition 5.2, and gX is the outcome
function, as given in Definition 6.3, with X = D/N , implements
the social choice function fd / fn (respectively).
PROOF. (Sketch.) This is to show that both agents reveal their
true types in dialogue sequences. Since Corollary 6.1 shows that
being honest is the dominant strategy, this holds.
The following example illustrates the use of Nash sequences as
a mechanism implementing the Nash social choice function.
EXAMPLE 6.1. (Example 4.1 cont.) To find all Nash equilibria
in the game of Example 1.1, four Nash dialogues, forming a Nash
sequence, are conducted with claims n(m, r), n(m,w), n(f, r)
and n(f, w), respectively (with both agents use the honest sequence
strategy). Example 4.1 gives one of the four dialogues. Dialogues
Dαβ (n(m,w)) and Dαβ (n(f, w)) are as follows:
〈α, β, 0, claim(n(m,w)), 1〉
〈α, β, 1, asm(n(m,w)), 2〉
〈α, β, 2, ctr(n(m,w), nN(m,w)), 3〉
〈β, α, 3, rl(nN(m,w)← vA(f, w) > vA(f, w)), 4〉
〈α, β, 4, rl(vA(f, w) > vA(m,w)←), 5〉
〈α, β, 3, rl(nN(m,w)← vB(m, r) > vB(m,w)), 6〉
〈β, α, 6, rl(vB(m, r) > vB(m,w)←), 7〉
〈β, α, 0, pi, 8〉
〈α, β, 0, pi, 9〉
〈α, β, 0, claim(n(f, w)), 1〉
〈α, β, 1, asm(n(f, w)), 2〉
〈α, β, 2, ctr(n(f, w), nN(f, w)), 3〉
〈β, α, 3, rl(nN(f, w)← vA(m,w) > vA(f, w)), 4〉
〈α, β, 0, pi, 5〉
〈α, β, 3, rl(nN(f, w)← vB(f, r) > vB(f, w)), 6〉
〈β, α, 0, pi, 7〉
Clearly, Dαβ (n(m,w)) is not successful, whereas Dαβ (n(f, w))
is. It is also easy to see that Dαβ (n(f, r)) cannot be successful.
Thus, the outcome of this sequence is {(m, r), (f, w)}, which is
the same as the output of the Nash social choice function.
The notions we have introduced in Sections 5 and 6 are sum-
marised in Table 3.
7. RELATED WORKS
Dung’s seminal work [9] introduces AA frameworks and stud-
ies, as an illustration of the use of AA, modelling n-person games
and stable marriage problems with AA. The first half of this paper
(sections 3 and 4) continues this spirit, yet instead of modelling a
single type of game, we give an ABA modelling for any game in
normal form.
[36] and [29] have introduced Argumentation Mechanism De-
sign. Their works give conditions on argumentation framework
structures that ensure truthfulness of agents. Instead of putting re-
strictions on argumentation frameworks, we look at utility settings
for enforcing truthfulness. Furthermore, [36] and [29] used the AA
framework whereas our work is based on ABA and ABA dialogues.
[35] present examples of logical mechanism design. The main
point of their work is to demonstrate introducing mechanism design
as a tool in the design of logical inference procedures, whereas
our paper focuses on directly applying mechanism design in ABA
dialogues.
Mechanism Design Concepts (x ∈ {α, β}) Argumentation Dialogues Dialogue Sequences
Type space (of agent x) Θx Σx, pix, 〈L,Rx,Ax, Cx〉 (Defn 5.1) as in dialogues
Outcomes O (σ?α, σ?β) or {} (Defn 5.4) {(σ1α, σ1β), (σ2α, σ2β), . . .} (Defn 6.3)
Utility function (for agent x) vx : O × θx → R pix(σ?α, σ?β) orWx (Defn 5.6) svx =
∑
vix (Defn 6.4)
Action space A = Aα ×Aβ 2Uα × 2Uβ (Defn 5.2) as in dialogues
Strategy (of agent x) sx : Θx ×A→ Ax sδx (Defn 5.3) sSx (Defn 6.2)
Social choice function f : Θα ×Θβ → O - fd & fn (Defn 6.5)
Table 3: Dialogues and dialogue sequences as mechanisms
[14] present a work on applying mechanism design in persuasion
dialogues. Ours work models generic games with ABA and uses a
different set of utility settings to ensure truthfulness of agents.
[20] present a work on designing mechanisms for agents in per-
suasion and conflict resolution dialogues with the DC system [24].
They are concerned with analysing existing dialogues with game
theoretic notions whereas we have studied the interplay between
dialogues and games in both directions.
[7] also use the Mackenzie dialogue system to study game strate-
gies. The difference is that they aim at implementing dialogue pro-
tocols with game theoretic notions whereas ours is about enforc-
ing good agents’ behaviours. Argumentation and dialogue settings
used in these two works are also different.
[1] present a work on studying agent strategies in persuasion
dialogues. Their approach derives dialogue strategies from pre-
defined agent profiles, e.g. agreeable agents that accept everything,
argumentative agents that challenge everything, etc, but without
linking dialogue results with agents’ internal beliefs.
Argumentation dialogues have been studied by various researchers
(e.g, see [26, 32, 5]). The dialogue model used here uses elements
from the model presented in [12] and [15]. They focus on present-
ing the dialogue model rather than being concerned with games.
[22] present a study on collaborative agent behaviours for re-
source sharing with a game theoretic approach with specific con-
straints. It is not linked to argumentation or dialogues.
[33] extends AA to a Game-based Argumentation Framework
to model agents with private knowledge engaging in sequences of
argumentation dialogues, where each dialogue is associated with
payoffs. That work does not formally study the relations between
extensive games and argumentation dialogues as it does not model
game-theoretic solution concepts with argumentation notions.
[38] investigate how to determine optimal strategies in argumen-
tation dialogues. The authors model dialogues as extensive games
with perfect information. They present computation of agents’ util-
ities in games with different dialogue strategies. [16] use an exam-
ple in [38] on modelling a legal argumentation dialogue with an
extensive game. It also observes that argumentation dialogues are
games of incomplete information, i.e. agents types, actions and
payoffs may be private. They have not studied ensuring agents’
good behaviour with games.
[18] introduce a persuasion game in which two arguers exchange
arguments for the purpose of persuading an audience witnessing the
argument. They study the problem in the case where there is uncer-
tainty on audience types. Although they introduce game-theoretic
elements, such as agents’ payoffs, their work does not focus on
modelling dialogues as games.
[17] and [25] study the computational complexity of “strategic
argumentation”. In both works, the authors consider argumenta-
tion dialogues not unlike ours. [17] have shown that the prob-
lem of identifying most suitable utterances in dialogues is NP-
complete. They have used two argumentation formalisms, argu-
mentation logic and agent logic, both structured argumentation for-
malisms, in their work. Their dialogue model also supports infor-
mation exchange in the level of sub-argument, i.e. literals and rules.
[25] have shown several additional complexity results with strate-
gic argumentation. Both works focus on complexity rather than
agent behaviours in the context of games.
[5] present a study on dialogue systems that support deliberation
dialogues. Their underlying argumentation framework is the in-
stantiated value-based argumentation framework. Their dialogue
model and results are concerned with agents with preferences. Their
system relies upon agents estimating their counterparts’ preferences
and does not study strategies with mechanism design.
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have shown how argumentation in the form of ABA can be
used to solve game theory problems, both statically and distribut-
edly via dialogues. We have built a correspondence between domi-
nant solutions, Nash equilibria, admissible arguments, and success-
ful dialogues. We have also studied agents’ strategic behaviours in
dialogues with (reverse) game-theoretic notions. Finally, we have
shown that, with specific utility settings, truthfulness of and disclo-
sure by agents can be ensured. The approach taken in the paper
consists of different “layers”: a bottom layer (the game to be simu-
lated, that we refer to as the underlying game), a middle layer (the
ABA framework and the dialogue sharing parts of the framework),
and a top-layer (a meta-level game, on top of the first two layers,
that has as a dominant solution a truthful dialogue).
This work opens many questions for future work. We have fo-
cused on dominance and Nash equilibria as solution concepts in the
underlying games. Could other concepts, such as Pareto Optimal-
ity, be usefully computed via argumentation? We have considered
pure strategies, what about mixed strategies in games? Could they
be computed with argumentation? Also, we have considered (un-
derlying) games in normal form. Could games in extensive form
of incomplete information be represented in ABA and ABA dia-
logues? We have treated the meta-level dialogical game as a normal
form game too, could this be interpreted instead as a game in exten-
sive form? Results presented in this work rely upon assigning the
honesty rewardW to agents. How shouldW be estimated in gen-
eral? Lemma 5.1 shows that no lowerW could work for the given
utility setting. Is there any other way of ensuring honesty under
different utility settings? Is there any relation between our honesty
reward and Vickrey auctions [23], in which the winner pays the
second-highest bid? Finally, it would be interesting to study the
computational complexity of our approach, making use of existing
results for ABA [8] and instantiating our approach within practical
MAS applications of games.
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